Notarizing documents for one’s own client is an area where New York law permits more than many attorneys assume, yet ethical missteps remain easy to make. That risk was underscored in Matter of Park, a recent Appellate Division decision sanctioning an attorney-notary who, despite being statutorily authorized to notarize for clients, failed to comply with basic notarial requirements.¹

Against that backdrop, the governing statutes of New York—particularly Executive Law Sections 135 and 136—create a narrow but meaningful exception allowing attorney-notaries to notarize for their own clients, a permission not commonly found outside of New York. Understanding how those provisions interact, where their limits lie, and how ethical obligations continue to apply is essential for ethical compliance.

Attorney Notarization in New York:
Statutory Authority and Limits

In New York, attorneys are not automatically notaries public. They must apply for and receive a commission from the Secretary of State, but they are exempt from the notary examination.² Once commissioned, Executive Law Section 135 (“Section 135”) expressly authorizes an attorney-notary to take the affidavit or acknowledgment of the attorney’s own client “in respect of any matter, claim, action or proceeding.”³

That authority is not unlimited. Executive Law Section 136 (“Section 136”) prohibits a notary from performing a notarial act in any matter in which the notary is a party or has a direct personal or pecuniary interest and strictly limits the fees that may be charged for notarial acts.⁴ Read together, these provisions permit attorney notarization for clients while drawing a firm boundary against self-interested acts.

Consistent with Section 135, an attorney may draft and notarize the affidavit of the client when the affidavit is part of the underlying legal matter. Drafting the document does not itself create a disqualifying interest; the interest of the attorney lies in the representation, not in the affidavit as a transactional instrument.⁵

Nevertheless, this dual role carries practical risk. Affidavits notarized by the drafting attorney may invite scrutiny from opposing counsel or the tribunal, particularly when the affiant is a lay witness. Although such challenges rarely succeed as a matter of law, they can distract from the merits and undermine the perceived neutrality of the evidence.

Financial Interest, Disqualification, and the Attorney Exception

Under Section 136, disqualification is narrow and fact specific. A notary is barred from performing a notarial act only where the notary is a party to the transaction or has a direct personal or pecuniary interest in the transaction being notarized.⁶ A generalized professional or financial interest in the outcome of litigation, even one that may ultimately affect attorney compensation, does not, standing alone, constitute a disqualifying interest.

Applying this standard, even where an attorney may be disqualified from notarizing a document due to a direct pecuniary interest, non-equity law firm employees, including associates and staff notaries, are generally not disqualified, because they lack any direct personal or pecuniary interest in the transaction being notarized. Equity partners occupy a different position, but firm ownership alone does not create a disqualifying interest. Although partners have an indirect financial interest in firm outcomes, that interest remains derivative of the representation itself, not the specific document being notarized. Section 135 reflects a legislative determination that such professional and financial interests do not, without more, bar attorney notarization for clients.

This principle applies across litigation contexts, including matrimonial matters, arbitrations, and civil rights actions, so long as the document relates to the claims of the client rather than the compensation or personal interests of the attorney.

Fee Shifting and Contingent Interests: When Compensation Does and Does Not Matter

Fee-shifting statutes operate within this same framework. Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), prevailing parents may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees from the school district, and their counsel’s compensation is often contingent on success.⁷ Similar fee-shifting regimes exist in civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,⁸ employment discrimination actions under Title VII⁹ and the ADA,¹⁰ and consumer protection claims under New York General Business Law Section 349.¹¹

In these contexts, the financial interest of the attorney remains derivative of the representation itself. The possibility of a statutory fee award does not convert the attorney into a party to the proceeding, nor does it create the type of direct pecuniary interest that disqualifies an attorney-notary, so long as the document being notarized concerns the substantive claims of the client rather than the entitlement of the attorney to fees.

Clear Prohibitions: Compensation and Self-Benefiting Documents

The Section 135 exception does not extend to documents that directly affect the attorney’s own compensation, including retainer agreements, fee authorizations, and assignments of attorneys’ fees. These instruments create a personal financial interest independent of the representation and fall squarely within the prohibition of Section 136.¹²

The analysis changes entirely where the attorney is effectively acting on their own behalf. An attorney may not notarize documents in matters where they are a party, including self-representation in a transaction, or instruments such as testamentary documents that confer a personal benefit on the attorney. Attempting to do so is difficult to reconcile with both the statutory text and basic conflict-of-interest principles.¹³

New York Is the Exception,
Not the Rule

The permissive statutory scheme of New York is atypical. In many jurisdictions, attorneys are prohibited from notarizing documents for their own clients altogether, regardless of whether the attorney has a direct or indirect financial interest in the transaction. 

Attorneys practicing in multiple jurisdictions must take care not to assume that the rules of New York apply elsewhere. Conduct expressly authorized under New York law may be prohibited, or subject to discipline, under the notary or professional responsibility rules of other states.

Procedural Compliance Remains Mandatory

Statutory authorization does not excuse procedural noncompliance. All notarial formalities remain mandatory. Unless the attorney holds a remote notary authorization under Section 135-c, the signer must appear in person. Identification must be verified, acknowledgments must be accurately completed, and notarial records must be correct.¹⁴ Ethical obligations under Rule 8.4(c) of the Rules of Professional Conduct apply fully to notarial acts.¹⁵

Conclusion

The statutory framework of New York affords attorney-notaries latitude not available in most jurisdictions, but that latitude is narrow and carefully circumscribed. Recent disciplinary authority confirms that statutory permission does not displace ethical obligations or excuse procedural noncompliance. Attorneys who treat notarization as a ministerial afterthought do so at their peril. Professional credibility, once compromised, is difficult to restore.

Endnotes

1. Matter of Park, 213 A.D.3d 106 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep’t 2025).
2. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 130(1), 131; see also N.Y. Exec. Law § 135.
3. N.Y. Exec. Law § 135.
4. N.Y. Exec. Law § 136.
5. See generally N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 135, 136.
6. N.Y. Exec. Law § 136; N.Y. Dept. of State, Notary Public License Law.
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12205.
11. N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 349(h).
12. N.Y. Exec. Law § 136.
13. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 135, 136; N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rules 1.7(a)(2), 8.4(c).
14. N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 135, 135-c, 137; N.Y. Dept. of State, Notary Public License Law.
15. Matter of Park, 213 A.D.3d at 112; N.Y. Rules of Prof’l Conduct Rule 8.4(c).