
CPLR Section 1007
A significant amendment of Section 1007 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (“CPLR”) becomes effective on April 18, 2026 (S8071, A8728). The amended statute requires that going forward, third party actions be commenced within 60 days of the defendant/third party plaintiff’s answer where the claim is contractual or within 60 days from becoming aware that the impleaded party may be liable; second third party actions must be commenced within 45 days of those events; third third party actions within 30 days; and any successive impleaders within 20 days (CPLR § 1007[b][1–4]). The purpose of the amendment is to control litigation delays. Service upon all such impleaded parties is to be accomplished within 20 days of filing (CPLR § 1007[a]), which is different than the general 120-day service of process rule of CPLR Rule 306-b. Court orders are required for any time extensions for impleaders that would exceed 30 days from the statutory deadlines (CPLR § 1007[b][5]). No third party action may be commenced after the filing of a note of issue in the primary action. If the post-note rule is violated, the third party action “shall” be severed or dismissed without prejudice (CPLR § 1007[c]). Exceptions in the amended law are limited to grave injury cases under the workers’ compensation law (CPLR § 1007[d]).
The math of the amended CPLR Section 1007 is clear where there is a contractual relationship between the third parties, unless, perhaps, if the existence of a contractual relationship is an issue in and of itself. In tort, the identity of third parties is sometimes not revealed until some discovery has been conducted. The amended statue provides the tort bar with some flexibility, to implead within 60 days from when the defendant “becomes aware” that a target third party defendant is or may be liable for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim. “Becomes aware” sounds like actual notice rather than the constructive variety, and pinpointing the date of awareness, with or without discovery, might provide fodder for future litigation in determining whether impleaders are timely brought in given instances.
CPLR Rule 2106
For the third time in as many years, CPLR Rule 2106 has been amended to expand the circumstances under which witnesses may now use affirmations in lieu of affidavits. Each successive amendment was necessitated to address ambiguities in the prior version. The latest version of CPLR Rule 2106, effective November 21, 2025, itemizes the circumstances where the affirmation procedure may be used, such as in executing responses to notices to admit, answers to interrogatories, verifying pleadings and bills of particular, and to remove any further doubt, “any other sworn statement.” Certificates qualify as well, presumably including but not necessarily limited to those required for the admissibility of hospital and municipal records under CPLR Rule 4518(c), and attorney certificates in certain actions subject to CPLR Sections 3012-a and 3012-b.
The latest version of CPLR Rule 2106 notes certain exceptions where affidavit procedures are still required. For instance, the statute still requires that persons swear to the truth of their statements at depositions, in taking oaths of office, and whenever an oath is required to be taken before a specified person. Moreover, the Domestic Relations Law controls over CPLR Rule 2106 whenever matrimonial agreements are required to be acknowledged in the same form as a deed.
Still unclear is how the courts and the bar should treat witness’s corrections to deposition transcripts (CPLR 3116[a]). While the newest version of CPLR Rule 2106 permits affirmations in lieu of “any other sworn statement,” deposition corrections are an extension of the deposition itself where the witness’s testimony was taken under oath before a notarial stenographer. It is recommended that out of an abundance of caution, practitioners continue using affidavits to correct deposition transcripts, subject to future legislative or decisional guidance.
The language of the statute is limited to “an action in New York.” By its terms, the language applies only to state litigations. Therefore, for non-litigation matters such as banking transactions, college applications, or good character recommendations required by the character and fitness committee for the admission of new attorneys to the bar, affidavits may continue to be required.
Gubernatorial Vetoes
Governor Hochul vetoed at least four pieces of legislation during the third week of December, 2025, which would have notably affected New York litigations. One was her fourth veto of the Grieving Families Act for Estates Powers and Trusts Law (“EPTL”) Section 5-4.3 (S4423, A6063) which, if signed, would have expanded compensable damages for wrongful death to include the “grief and suffering” of the decedent’s “close family members,” as defined, and with certain exceptions. EPTL Section 5-4.1 also would have been amended to extend the statute of limitations for wrongful death claims by an additional year. The governor’s veto message cited concerns about insurance premiums and increased stress on healthcare systems.
The Governor vetoed a proposed addition to the CPLR, Section 1405 (S5170, A3351), that, if signed, would have permitted plaintiffs to directly recover damages from third party defendants liable for contribution or indemnity, if the judgment is not collectible from the direct defendant within 30 days from its service on the defendant. The amended legislation included certain narrow exceptions. Had the amendment been signed, plaintiffs would have been able to secure recoveries from parties they had never sued, and for whom there is perhaps no privity, which is part of the reason for the governor’s veto of the bill.
The governor likewise vetoed an addition to the CPLR, Section 5003-c (S8185, A8706). Had it been signed, the settlement of any tort claim within 30 days of the underlying occurrence would be voidable at the option of the claimant-releasor. The legislative intent was to prevent high-pressure or other unfair settlement practices before claimants have sufficient opportunity to consult counsel or to fully consider their options.
Finally, Governor Hochul “tabled” the enactment of a new section to the CPLR, Section 301-a (S8186, A8303), which effectively killed it with the legislature in recess at the time. The legislative amendment would have recognized the state’s general jurisdiction over out-of-state entities which register to do business in New York. Similar proposed legislation has been vetoed on two earlier occasions. Had the legislation been signed, out-of-state corporations would have been subject to suit in New York for causes of actions with or without any particular connection to the state. Governor Hochul vetoed the bill in the belief that the amendment would be bad for attracting businesses into New York.
Hon. Mark C. Dillon is a Justice of the Appellate Division, Second Department, an Adjunct Professor of New York Practice at Fordham Law School, and a contributing author of CPLR Practice Commentaries in McKinney’s.