In the 2011 movie The Lincoln Lawyer, a client of attorney Mickey Haller (Matthew McConaughey) confesses to a homicide for which another client had been convicted—then smugly reminds the lawyer that the confession is subject to attorney-client privilege.

Sometimes art imitates life; more often, they rhyme. In 1982, a real-life Alton Logan was charged for a fatal shooting during a Chicago robbery. No physical evidence linked Logan to the scene, and the gun was found at the home of nonparty Andrew Wilson, held on unrelated murder charges. During Logan’s trial, Wilson told his public defenders, Dale Coventry and Jamie Kunz, that Wilson had committed the robbery turned murder —and that Logan was innocent.

Rule 1.6, of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, however, barred Coventry and Kunz from revealing Wilson’s confession on pain of a potentially long suspension from the practice of law.¹ They kept Wilson’s secret through Logan’s trial and conviction, failed appeals and habeas petitions,² and for another 16 years until Wilson died in 2007. Only then did they produce an affirmation they signed back in 1982 attesting to Wilson’s confession. For 25 years, they kept it in a fireproof lockbox under Coventry’s bed.³

After 26 years in prison, Logan was freed in 2008.⁴ That year, 60 Minutes broadcast a segment about Logan, “26-Year Secret Kept Innocent Man in Prison.”⁵ In 2009, Logan was exonerated.⁶ In 2012, he sued,⁷ receiving a $10 million settlement from the City of Chicago. In 2017, Logan wrote an acclaimed book, Justice Failed: How ‘Legal Ethics’ Kept Me in Prison for 26 Years.

Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Rule 1.6”) concerning confidentiality sometimes exacts a tragic price. Jose Morales spent 13 years in prison,⁸ and Lee Hunt died there,⁹ after lawyers secreted other clients’ exculpating confessions. A lawyer might learn in the course of a representation that a client is poised to commit a crime, perpetrate a fraud or cause serious physical harm. 

What should lawyers do if client confidences might harm others?

Public-Interest Exceptions to Rule 1.6 Confidentiality

Coventry and Kunz attended the penalty phase of Logan’s trial, their affirmation in hand. They reasoned that Logan’s conviction did not let them speak, but a death sentence might.¹⁰
Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality carries a list of public-interest exceptions, among them in nearly all states a lawyer “may reveal or use confidential information to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes necessary [to] prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.”¹¹ In most states including New York, there is no public-interest exception to redress wrongful conviction, but “[w]rongful execution of a person is a life-threatening and imminent harm” allowing disclosure after entry of a death sentence.¹²

CBS interviewed Logan, Coventry and Kunz about what it was like to sit in court—Logan at the defense table, Coventry and Kunz in the gallery—during the penalty phase:

[Coventry said,] “It was creepy…. I was looking at the jurors thinking, ‘My God, they’re going to decide to kill the wrong guy.’”
In the end, the jurors spared Logan’s life.
“It was a 10 to 2 vote. Ten for, two against. Two individuals saved my life,” Logan explained.
And the jurors saved Kunz and Coventry from coming forward.¹³

Besides preventing death or substantial bodily harm, the crime-fraud exception allows lawyers to reveal client confidences to the extent lawyers reasonably believe necessary under Rule 1.6(b)(2) to “prevent the client from committing a crime,” or under Rule 1.6(b)(3) to keep a legal opinion from “being used to further a crime or fraud.” Since Rule 1.6 exceptions can inhibit “the open dialogue between lawyer and client that is deemed essential to effective representation,”¹⁴ before disclosure, a lawyer should weigh six factors:

1. the seriousness of the potential injury to others if the prospective harm or crime occurs,
2. the likelihood that it will occur and its imminence,
3. the apparent absence of any other feasible way to prevent the potential injury,
4. the extent to which the client may be using the lawyer’s services in bringing about the harm or crime, 
5. the circumstances under which the lawyer acquired the information of the client’s intent or prospective course of action, and
6. any other aggravating or extenuating circumstances.¹⁵

Even then, public-interest disclosure usually is a “last resort” after “remonstrating with the client” and making a “threat of disclosure” to prod the client to self-disclose.¹⁶

Client Death and Public-Interest Exceptions

But what if the client is dead?

In New York, attorney-client privilege survives client death, as does the right of waiver.¹⁷ Thus, a deceased client’s personal representative can waive privilege under Rule 1.6(a), Section 4503(a) of the Civil Procedure Law and Rules (“CPLR”) and Section 60.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”).¹⁸

This survivorship approach is the majority rule nationwide.¹⁹ In New York and most states, unless a public-interest exception applies, disclosure after the death of a client requires consent of the client’s executor or administrator, who may knowingly waive privilege for any reason.²⁰ If a public-interest exception applies, before disclosing on one’s own—absent urgency to prevent imminent harm—the lawyer should ask the personal representative of the client to waive privilege. 

Public-Interest Reform Efforts

In New York and most states, public-interest disclosure always is discretionary. After Logan’s exoneration, Illinois required lawyers to disclose as necessary to avert wrongful conviction, save life or avert substantial bodily harm.²¹ Connecticut now mandates disclosure to prevent a client from causing death or substantial bodily harm²² —as does New Jersey, which also requires disclosure for “substantial injury to another’s finances or property.”²³ Alaska and Massachusetts allow but do not require disclosure to prevent a wrongful “incarceration.”

Other Rule 1.6 reforms failed, though ethicists began calling for them immediately after Logan was freed.²⁵ The ABA Criminal Justice Section proposed a Model Rule 1.6 exception in 2009 to prevent wrongful conviction. The New York City Bar Association’s Committee on Professional Responsibility proposed likewise in 2010,²⁶ albeit only after a client dies. A 2020 New Jersey panel proposed mandating disclosure to prevent wrongful conviction.²⁷ One reform would place on all lawyers the Model Rule 3.8(g)-(h) duty of prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence. None of these reforms have yet become law due to concerns about preserving clients’ trust in lawyers. As ethicist Stephen Gillers put it, “Lawyers are not undercover informants.”

Conclusion

So what is an ethical New York lawyer to do if a client secret might harm innocents?

Take a breath. Weigh the six Rule 1.6 circumstantial factors dispassionately.

Get independent advice. Rule 1.6(b)(4) invites lawyers to share client confidences with counsel for advice about compliance and potential further disclosure. You need not go it alone.

If unsure or all else fails, seek a court order. Rule 1.6(b)(6) authorizes disclosure “to comply with [a] court order.” Consider seeking one from an appropriate tribunal.
And if you opt not to disclose, maybe make a record and keep it in a lockbox under your bed. The call of conscience—and the law—might change.

Endnotes

1. See e.g. Matter of Cobb, 237 A.D.3d 134 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t. 2025).
2. See People v. Logan, 586 N.E.2d 679 (Ill. App. 1991); People v. Logan, 502 N.E.2d 874 (Ill. App. 1991); People v. Hope, 508 N.E.2d (Ill. 1986); People v. Logan, 491 N.E.2d 753 (Ill. 1986).
3. 60 Minutes, “26-Year Secret Kept Innocent Man In Prison,” Columbia Broadcasting Serv. (Mar. 9, 2008). 
4. M. McDonough, “26-Year Inmate Freed After Lawyers Reveal Real Killer,” ABA J. (Apr. 18, 2008).
5. Id.
6. See Natl. Registry of Exonerations: Alton Logan (Aug. 29, 2011).
7. See Logan v. City of Chicago, 891 F. Supp. 2d 897 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
8. See Morales v. Portuondo, 154 F. Supp. 2d 706 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
9. See State v. Hunt, 659 S.E.2d 6 (N.C. 2008); Associated Press, “Time Runs Out for Prisoner Trying to Prove Innocence,” N.Y. Post (Apr. 10, 2019); T. Walker, “Rectifying a Wrong or Requiring Reticence? An Attorney’s Duty of Client Confidentiality,” 58 Univ. Ill. Chicago L. Rev. 441 (2024).
10. See 60 Minutes, supra n.3.
11. ABA Model Rule 1.6(b)(1); 22 N.Y.C.R.R. [Rules of Prof. Conduct] pt 1200.0, rule [“RPC”] 1.6(b)(1).
12. N.Y. RPC 1.6, Comment [6B].  New York struck down its death-penalty statute.  See People v LaValle, 3 N.Y.3d 88 (2004).
13. See 60 Minutes, supra n.3.
14. Spectrum Sys. Intern. Corp. v. Chem. Bank, 78 N.Y.2d 371, 377 (1991).
15. N.Y. RPC 1.6, Comment [6A].
16. Id.
17. See Matter of Riconda, 90 N.Y.2d 733 (1997); Matter of Thomas, 179 A.D.3d 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 4th Dep’t. 2019); Matter of Johnson, 7 A.D.3d 959 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep’t. 2004), lv. denied 3 N.Y.3d 606 (2004); Mayorga v. Tate, 302 A.D.2d 11 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t. 2002); People v. Vespucci, 192 Misc.2d 685 (Sup. Ct. Nassau Co. 2002).
18. See e.g. Vespucci, 192 Misc.2d at 688.
19. See generally Swidler & Berlin v. U.S., 524 U.S. 399 (1998).
20. See Thomas, 179 A.D.3d at 101-02; Matter of Bassin, 28 A.D.3d 549, 550 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dept. 2006).
21. See Ill. Rules of Prof. Responsibility, Rule 1.6(c).
22. Conn. Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.6(b).
23. N.J. Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.6(b).
24. Alaska Rules of Prof. Conduct, Rule 1.6(b)(1)(C); Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct. Rule 3:07 [Rules of Prof. Conduct], Rule 1.6(b)(1).
25. See e.g. C. Miller, “Ordeal by Innocence: Why There Should Be a Wrongful Incarceration / Execution Exception to Attorney-Client Confidentiality,” 102 Nw. L. Rev. Colloquy 391 (2008); see also Walker, supra n.9, at 464.
26. N.Y. City Bar Assn., “Proposed Amendment to [RPC] 1.6 – Authorizing Disclosure of Confidential Information of Deceased Client” (2010).
27. See N.J. Sup. Ct. Working Group on the Duty of Confidentiality and Wrongful Convictions, “Report and Recommendations” (2020).